In the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an extension of that of value, has been recently proposed to measure the overall influence of coalitions in games. Axiomatizations of two classes of generalized values, namely probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues, which extend probabilistic values and semivalues, respectively, are first proposed. The axioms we utilize are based on natural extensions of axioms involved in the axiomatizations of values. In the second half of the paper, special instances of generalized semivalues are also axiomatized.
Introduction
It is well known that the notion of value (see e.g. [2, 5, 9, 17, 18] ) has been introduced to measure the individual power of each player in a cooperative game. In some sense, this individual power can be regarded as the influence the player has in the game.
It is natural to extend this notion of power to coalitions of players. For example, suppose two or three players join together to form a partnership in a game. It is then much more relevant to measure the power or the strength of such a coalition in the game rather than the power of each of these players. This is exactly the role played by the generalized values, which have been recently introduced by Marichal [12] to measure the overall influence of every coalition in a game. More precisely, the concept of generalized value stems from the investigation of the influence of variables on Boolean and pseudo-Boolean functions [4, 10, 12] , which was motivated by the problem of searching for robust voting schemes in game theory [3] .
Let v : 2 N → R be a cooperative game on a finite set of players N . For a coalition S ⊆ N , the main generalized values introduced in [12] where n = |N |, s = |S|, and t = |T |. As we can see, these expressions can be interpreted as weighted means of the marginal contributions v(T ∪ S) − v(T ) of coalition S to outer coalitions T ⊆ N \S. As they clearly coincide with Shapley and Banzhaf values on singletons (i.e., when S = {i}), we will naturally call them the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values, respectively.
In this paper we introduce and axiomatize two families of generalized values, namely the broad class of probabilistic generalized values and the narrower subclass of generalized semivalues obtained by additionally imposing the symmetry axiom. Probabilistic generalized values can be seen as extensions of probabilistic values studied by Weber [18] . Generalized semivalues are extensions of semivalues, which were axiomatized by Dubey et al. [5] . We show that this latter subclass encompasses the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values, but also the game itself and its dual. We also axiomatize these particular instances of generalized semivalues.
Besides the classical axiom of linearity, the axioms involved in the characterizations we present can be regarded as natural generalizations of those used in the axiomatizations of values. Two of the most important axioms in the proposed characterizations of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues are the dummy coalition axiom, which is a natural extension of the dummy player axiom [18, §3] , and the positivity axiom, which generalizes the one for values [11, §4] (called monotonicity in [18, §4] ). The notion of partnership (see e.g. [11] ) is also at the root of some of the axioms we additionally impose to characterize the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values.
In addition to these characterization results we provide a representation theorem for generalized semivalues, extending that of semivalues by Dubey et al. [5] . We also provide a compact formula linking any generalized semivalue with the well-known Owen multilinear extension of a game [15] . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some basic definitions and results we use in this paper. In Section 3 we introduce the class of probabilistic generalized values and that of generalized semivalues. In the last section we present our characterization results. Probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues are first axiomatized. Then, we yield representation theorems for generalized semivalues. Finally, the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values as well as three other instances of generalized semivalues are characterized by imposing additional axioms.
In order to avoid a heavy notation, we adopt that used in [8] . Thus, we will often omit braces for singletons, e.g., by writing v(i), U \ i instead of v({i}), U \ {i}. Similarly, for pairs, we will write ij instead of {i, j}. Furthermore, cardinalities of subsets S, T, . . . , will often be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters s, t, . . . , otherwise by the standard notation |S|, |T |, . . .
Preliminary definitions
We consider an infinite set U , the universe of players. As usual, a game on U is a set function v : 2 U → R such that v(∅) = 0, which assigns to each coalition S ⊆ U its worth v(S).
In this section we recall some concepts and results we will use throughout.
Carriers
A set N ⊆ U is said to be a carrier (or support) of a game v when v(S) = v(N ∩ S) for all S ⊆ U . Thus, a game v with carrier N ⊆ U is completely defined by the knowledge of the coefficients {v(S)} S⊆N and the players outside N have no influence on the game since they do not contribute to any coalition. In this paper, we restrict our attention to finite games, that is, games that possess finite carriers. We denote by G the set of finite games on U and by G N the set of games with finite carrier N ⊂ U .
Dividends and Möbius transform
Let us recall an equivalent representation of a game. Any game v ∈ G N can be uniquely expressed in terms of its dividends {m(v, S)} S⊆N (see e.g. [9] ) by
In combinatorics, the set function m(v, · ) : 2 U → R is called the Möbius transform [16] of v and is given by m(v, S) :=
Unanimity games
Let us now recall two important simple games of G N . The unanimity game for T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is defined as the game u T such that, for all S ⊆ N , u T (S) := 1 if and only if S ⊇ T and 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that T is a carrier of u T and that its Möbius transform is given, for all S ⊆ N , by m(u T , S) = 1 if and only if S = T and 0 otherwise.
Following Dubey et al. [5, §1] , for any T ⊆ N , we also consider the gameû T ∈ G N , defined for all S ⊆ N , byû T (S) := 1 if and only if S T and 0 otherwise.
Permuted games
Following Shapley [17, §2] , given a game v ∈ G N and a permutation π on U (i.e., a one-toone mapping from U onto itself), we denote by πv the game defined by
where π(S) := {π(i) | i ∈ S}. Note that π(N ) is a carrier of πv.
Restricted and reduced games
Given a game v ∈ G N and a coalition A ⊆ N , the restriction of
This is equivalent to considering for v only coalitions containing players of A. Given a coalition B ⊆ N \ A, the restriction of v to A in the presence of
This is equivalent to considering for v only coalitions containing coalition B and some players of A. Given a game v ∈ G N and a coalition T ⊆ N , T = ∅, the reduced game with respect to T [8, 14] 
indicates a single hypothetical player, which is the representative (or macro player) of the players in T . It is defined by
Dummy coalitions and partnerships
In other words, the marginal contribution of a dummy coalition S to any coalition T not containing elements of S is simply its worth v(S).
A coalition S ⊆ U in a game v ∈ G N is said to be null if it is a dummy coalition in v such that v(S) = 0.
A dummy (resp. null ) player is a dummy (resp. null ) one-membered coalition. A coalition P ⊆ U , P = ∅, is said to be a partnership [11, §4] 
P and all T ⊆ U \ P . In other words, as long as all the members of a partnership P are not all in coalition, the presence of some of them only leaves unchanged the worth of any coalition not containing elements of P . In particular v(S) = 0 for all S P .
Notice that, thus defined, a partnership behaves like a single hypothetical player, that is, the game v and its reduced version v [P ] can be considered as equivalent. Now, a dummy partnership is simply a partnership P ⊆ U that is dummy. Thus, a dummy partnership can be regarded as a single hypothetical dummy player. It is easy to verify that any coalition P ⊆ U is a dummy partnership in the corresponding unanimity game u P .
The concept of generalized value
We now introduce the concepts of probabilistic generalized value and generalized semivalue and present five instances of them. Probabilistic values and semivalues are first recalled.
Probabilistic values and semivalues
As mentioned in the introduction, generalized values can be seen as extensions of values. In turn, a value can be seen as a function φ : G × U → R that assigns to every player i ∈ U in a game v ∈ G his/her prospect φ(v, i) from playing the game. The exact form of a value depends on the axioms that are imposed on it. For instance, the well-known Shapley value can be defined as the sole value that satisfies the linearity, dummy player, symmetry, and efficiency axioms [18, Theorem 15] .
Given a game v ∈ G N , the Shapley value of a player i ∈ N is given by
If i / ∈ N , we set φ Sh (v, i) := 0; see also [17, Lemma 1] . Another frequently encountered value is the Banzhaf value [2, 6] . The Banzhaf value of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G N is defined by
Here also, if i ∈ N , we set φ B (v, i) := 0.
The Shapley and Banzhaf values are instances of probabilistic values [18] and, more precisely, of semivalues [5] .
A probabilistic value φ p of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G N is a value of the form
where the family of coefficients {p i T (N )} T ⊆N \i forms a probability distribution on 2 N \i . Again, if i ∈ N , we naturally set φ p (v, i) := 0.
Thus defined, φ p (v, i) can be interpreted as the mathematical expectation on 2 N \i of the marginal contribution v(T ∪ i) − v(T ) of player i to a coalition T ⊆ N \ i with respect to the probability distribution {p
A semivalue is a probabilistic value such that, additionally, for all i ∈ N , the coefficients p i T (N ) (T ⊆ N \ i) depend only on the cardinalities of the coalitions i, T , and N , i.e., there exist n nonnegative real numbers {p t (n)} t=0,...,n−1 fulfilling
Probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues
By analogy with the works of Dubey et al. [5] and Weber [18] on values, we can define the class of probabilistic generalized values and the subclass of generalized semivalues.
A probabilistic generalized value of a coalition S ⊆ N in a game v ∈ G N is of the form
where, for any S ⊆ N , the family of coefficients {p
A generalized semivalue is a probabilistic generalized value such that, additionally, for any S ⊆ N , the coefficients p 
These indices are extensions of the Shapley and Banzhaf values in the sense that
Another relevant generalized semivalue, which extends the Shapley value, is given by the formula
This generalized value will be called the chaining generalized value, by analogy with the concept of chaining interaction index [13] , which is another probabilistic linear expression constructed with the same coefficients as in formula (1). We will yield an axiomatization of it in the next section. Besides the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values, the mappings
where
, are also generalized semivalues. The coefficients of Φ int (v, S) are defined by p s t (n) = 1 if t = 0 and 0 otherwise, while the coefficients of Φ ext (v, S) are defined by p s t (n) = 1 if t = n − s and 0 otherwise. These indices will be called internal and external generalized values, respectively. This terminology will be justified in Section 4.5.
Interpretation of probabilistic generalized values
Similarly to probabilistic values, an interpretation of probabilistic generalized values can be easily given.
Consider a game v ∈ G N and suppose that any coalition S ⊆ N joins an outer coalition T ⊆ N \ S picked at random with probability p S T (N ). Then the generalized value Φ p (v, S) can be immediately thought of as the mathematical expectation of the marginal contribution [v(T ∪ S) − v(T )] of S to the coalition T . Depending on the given randomization scheme, this generalized value takes a well defined form. For example,
• if the coalition S is equally likely to join any coalition T ⊆ N \ S, its probability to join is p S T (N ) = 1 2 n−s and we get Φ B (v, S); • if the coalition S is equally likely to join any coalition T ⊆ N \ S of size t (0 ≤ t ≤ n − s) and that all coalitions of size t are equally likely, its probability to join is p
and we get Φ Sh (v, S).
Such an interpretation of Φ p (v, S), which naturally extends that of values (see e.g. [18] ), is in full accordance with the idea of a generalized power index. The power of any coalition S in v should not be solely determined by its worth v(S), but also by all v(S ∪ T ) such that T ⊆ N \ S. Indeed, the worth v(S) may be very low, suggesting that S has a rather weak power, while v(S ∪ T ) may be much larger than v(S) for many coalitions T ⊆ N \ S, suggesting that S actually has a great power.
As expected, we have Φ p (v, ∅) = 0 trivially, which means that the the empty coalition has no power.
Axiomatic characterizations
In this final section, we provide our axiomatization and representation results. We first axiomatize the classes of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues and we yield representation theorems for the latter class. Then, by means of additional axioms, we characterize the Shapley, Banzhaf, chaining, internal, and external generalized values.
In the rest of the paper, a generalized value is regarded as a function Φ : G × 2 U → R such that, for any v ∈ G and any S ⊆ U , Φ(v, S) reflects the power of coalition S in the game v.
Characterizations of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues
We shall now axiomatize the class of probabilistic generalized values and that of generalized semivalues. The proofs, mainly inspired from Weber [18] , are given in Appendix A. The following axioms are first considered:
• Carrier axiom (C) : For any finite N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, and any v ∈ G N , we have
• Linearity axiom (L) : Φ is a linear function with respect to its first argument.
• Additivity axiom (A) : Φ is an additive function with respect to its first argument.
• Positivity axiom (P) : For any monotone v ∈ G, we have Φ(v, S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ U .
• First dummy coalition axiom (DC') : If S ⊆ U is a dummy coalition in a game v ∈ G, then Φ(v, S) = v(S).
• Symmetry axiom (S) : For any permutation π on U , and any v ∈ G, we have Φ(v, S) = Φ(πv, π(S)) for all S ⊆ U .
These axioms are very natural and have straightforward interpretations. Axiom (C) means that the players outside the carrier should not contribute to the power of any coalition. Axiom (L) (resp. (A)) indicates that generalized values should be decomposable linearly (resp. additively) whenever games are decomposable linearly (resp. additively). Axiom (P), used for one-membered coalitions by Weber [18, §4] to characterize probabilistic values, states that, since in a monotone game the marginal contributions of any coalition are necessarily nonnegative, its generalized value should be nonnegative, too. Axiom (DC'), which is a generalization of the classical dummy axiom [18, §3] , states that a dummy coalition has a generalized value equal to its worth. Finally, axiom (S) indicates that the names of the players play no role in determining the generalized values.
We first present an immediate description of linear generalized values. 
Now, by using axiom (P), we can easily characterize the classes of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues. It is noteworthy that, under this axiom, axiom (L) can be weakened into (A), as the following lemma shows. 
and for any S N and any v ∈ G N , we have Φ(v, S) = Φ(v, S ∩ N ).
Representation theorems for generalized semivalues
We now present a generalization of the representation theorem given by Dubey et al. [ 
where the integral is to be understood in the sense of Riemann-Stieltjes.
Thus, with each generalized semivalue Φ p is associated a unique denumerable family of CDFs F := {F s | s ≥ 1} and we will write Φ F := Φ p . Note that, for s = 0, the coefficients p s t (n) in Theorem 4.2 are undetermined and hence they can be defined also from Eq. (2).
Remark. It is easy to see that the CDFs corresponding to the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values as well as for the internal and external generalized values are given in the following table, where, for any E ⊆ [0, 1], 1 E denotes the characteristic function of E.
The following result will be useful as we go on.
Proposition 4.3. For any finite N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, and any S ⊆ N , any generalized semivalue can be rewritten in terms of the Möbius transform as
where, for all T ⊆ N , with T ∩ S = ∅,
By combining Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 4.3, it is easy to see that, for any finite N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, we have 
Remark. Eq. (3) shows that any generalized semivalue Φ p is a weighted sum over T ⊆ N , with T ∩ S = ∅, of the dividends m(v, T ). In this sum, each coefficient q s |T \S| represents the extent to which m(v, T ) contributes in the computation of Φ p . For example, for the chaining and Banzhaf interaction indices, these coefficients are respectively given by 
and, for any S ⊆ N , let σ S g denote its S-slack, i.e., the difference
where, for any x, y ∈ R, z = x S y −S denotes the n-dimensional vector defined by z i = x, if i ∈ S, and z i = y, else. It can be proved [12, §3] (see Owen [15] for the case s = 1) that
which means that the Shapley generalized value related to S can be obtained by integrating the S-slack of g along the main diagonal of the unit hypercube. By combining Eq. (4) and the formula
(see [12, §3] ), we can immediately extend formula (5) to any generalized semivalue. The result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.4. Let N ⊂ U finite, n ≥ 1, and v ∈ G N . For any generalized semivalue Φ F , associated with the family of CDFs F := {F s | s ≥ 1}, we have
where g : [0, 1] n → R is the multilinear extension of v.
We shall now proceed with the characterizations of the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values as well as the internal and external generalized values, which all are instances of generalized semivalues.
Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values
The following axioms are first additionally considered:
• Recursivity axiom (R) : For any finite N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, and any disjoint coalitions
• Second dummy coalition axiom (DC") : For any finite
• Reduced partnership consistency axiom (RPC) : For any finite
Axiom (R) means that when a coalition T ⊆ N joins a coalition S ⊆ N \T , the resulting power equals the power of S in the absence of T plus the power of T in the presence of S. If, in addition, the joining coalition T is dummy then axiom (DC") says that the power of T is not influenced by the presence of S. Now, recall that a partnership P can be considered as behaving like a single hypothetical player. Axiom (RPC) identifies the power of this partnership with that of its representative [P ] in the corresponding reduced game v [P ] .
We now prove that, for any generalized semivalue Φ p , the three axioms above are equivalent. Moreover, in this case, Φ p is completely determined by its corresponding value on singletons. The proof of this result is given in Appendix C. ii) Φ p satisfies axiom (DC").
iii) Φ p satisfies axiom (RPC). iv) For any n ≥ 1, any s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and any t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s}, we have • Efficiency (E) : For any N ⊂ U finite, n ≥ 1, and any v ∈ G N , we have
• 2-efficiency (2-E) : For any N ⊂ U finite, n ≥ 2, and any v ∈ G N , we have
Axiom (E), initially considered by Shapley [17] , is dedicated to values and ensures that the players of N in a game v ∈ G N share the total amount v(N ) among them in terms of their respective values. Axiom (2-E), initially considered by Nowak [14] , expresses the fact that the sum of the values of two players should be equal to the value of these players considered as twins in the corresponding reduced game.
The following lemmas can be immediately deduced from [18, Theorem 15] and [8, Theorem 2]. Lemma 4.3. If Φ p is a generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (E), then, for any v ∈ G and any i ∈ U , Φ p (v, i) is the Shapley value of i in the game v. Theorem 4.5. The Shapley generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (R or DC" or RPC) and (E). As a consequence, the Shapley generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC'), (P), (S), (R or DC" or RPC), and (E). Theorem 4.6. The Banzhaf generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (R or DC" or RPC) and (2-E). As a consequence, the Banzhaf interaction index is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC'), (P), (S), (R or DC" or RPC), and (2-E).
Characterizations of the Banzhaf and chaining generalized values by means of the partnership-allocation axiom
We consider the following additional axiom :
• Partnership-allocation axiom (PA) : For any N ⊂ U finite, n ≥ 1, and any partnership
Let N ⊂ U finite, n ≥ 1, Φ p be a generalized semivalue, P ⊆ N be a partnership in a game v ∈ G N , and i be a member of P . Axiom (PA) is based on the following intuitive reasoning.
1. We know that Φ p (v, P ) is a weighted arithmetic mean of the marginal contributions v(T ∪ P ) − v(T ) (T ⊆ N \ P ) and it is easy to verify that Φ p (v, i) is a weighted sum of these same marginal contributions. In other words, both Φ p (v, P ) and Φ p (v, i) can be considered as measuring the value in the game v of the hypothetical macro player corresponding to P .
Let α be a real number such that Φ
Notice that this equality still holds if i is replaced with any other player j ∈ P , since all players in a partnership play symmetric roles. Hence, the coefficient α depends only on v and P and can then be seen as determining the way Φ p (v, P ) is calculated from the value of any of the players of the partnership, quantity that contains all the "relevant information" as discussed in Point 1.
3. It could then be required that the way the value of P is determined from the value of any player of the partnership does not depend on the underlying game. Therefore, it depends only on |P |, which justifies axiom (PA).
For generalized semivalues Φ p , the expression of α |P | in Eq. (6) can be easily obtained. We simply have
since coalition P is always a dummy partnership in the unanimity game u P . We now show that, under axiom (PA), any generalized semivalue Φ p is completely determined by its corresponding value on singletons. The proof is given in Appendix D. 
We can now state another characterization of the Banzhaf generalized value and a characterization of the chaining generalized value. These characterizations immediately follow from Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Theorem 4.7. The Banzhaf generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (PA) and (2-E). As a consequence, the Banzhaf generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC'), (P), (S), (PA), and (2-E).
Theorem 4.8. The chaining generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (PA) and (E). As a consequence, the chaining interaction index is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC'), (P), (S), (PA), and (E).
Characterizations of the internal and external generalized values
Finally, we consider two last axioms in order to characterize the internal and external generalized values (i.e., the game itself and its dual) :
• Internal generalized value axiom (IGV) : For any S ⊆ U , s ≥ 1, and any v ∈ G, we have Φ(v, S) = Φ(v S , S).
• External generalized value axiom (EGV) : For any N ⊂ U finite, n ≥ 1, any S ⊆ N , s ≥ 1, and any v ∈ G N , we have Φ(v, S) = Φ(v S ∪N \S , S).
Axiom (IGV) simply states that the generalized value of a coalition S in a game v should be independent of players that are outside S. At the opposite, axiom (EGV) states the generalized value of a coalition S in a game v should be measured in the presence of all outside players.
We can then state the following two characterizations. They are immediate since, for any probabilistic generalized value Φ p , we have
Theorem 4.9. The internal generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (IGV). As a consequence, the internal generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC'), (P), and (IGV).
Theorem 4.10. The external generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (EGV). As a consequence, the external generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC'), (P), and (EGV).
Conclusion
Axiomatic characterizations of the broad class of probabilistic generalized values and of the narrower subclass of generalized semivalues have been proposed. The presented characterizations are mainly based on a natural generalization of the dummy player axiom, namely the dummy coalition axiom. Then, by further imposing classical axioms such as efficiency, 2-efficiency, as well as some other natural axioms, we have characterized the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values. In a companion paper [7] we provide axiomatizations of probabilistic and cardinalprobabilistic interaction indices, that is, probabilistic linear indices measuring the interaction phenomena among players [8] . Although the approach is formally similar, the axioms proposed in [7] are more focused on the concept of partnership and dummy partnership. Let S N . From Proposition 4.1, for any v ∈ G N , we have
Let us prove that
This is true when T = N \ S. Indeed, since S is dummy in u N \S , we have
Now, assume the result holds for |T | ≥ k + 1, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n − s − 1, and show it still holds for |T | = k. Considering K ⊆ N \ S, with |K| = k ≥ 1, we have, since S is dummy in u K ,
by induction hypothesis and axiom (DC'). Now, it follows from Eqs. (7) and (8) that
for all v ∈ G N . Clearly, we can now assume that S = ∅. Coalition S being dummy in u S , we immediately have that T ⊆N \S α S T ∪S (N ) = 1 from axiom (DC'). It follows that, for any w ∈ G N in which S is a dummy coalition, we have
By choosing an appropriate such game w, we can easily prove that the coefficients α 
Consequently, for any v ∈ G N , we have 
Proof of Lemma 4.1
We only need to show that, for any v ∈ G, any λ ∈ R, and any S ⊆ U , we have Φ(λv, S) = λΦ(v, S). Since the family of unanimity games {u T } T ⊆U, T =∅ is a basis of G, it suffices to prove the equality when v is an arbitrary unanimity game.
Let S, T ⊆ U , with T = ∅, and let λ ∈ R. Consider sequences r k and s k of rational numbers converging to λ and such that s k ≤ λ ≤ r k for all k. By (A), we have Φ(r k u T , S) = r k Φ(u T , S) and Φ(s k u T , S) = s k Φ(u T , S) for all k. Now, by (P) the following real sequences
are clearly nonnegative. On the other hand, by (A), the first one converges to l := λΦ(u T , S) − Φ(λu T , S) and the second one converges to −l. It follows that l = 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Sufficiency) Trivial.
(Necessity) The proof is similar to that of Weber [18, Theorem 4] . By lemma 4.1, Φ fulfills axiom (L) and Proposition 4.2 applies. Consider a finite set N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, let S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and fix T * ⊆ N \ S. The simple gameû T * is monotone and we have Φ(û T * , S) = p S T * (N ). From axiom (P), this coefficient is nonnegative. When S = ∅, the coefficients can be chosen arbitrarily, and hence nonnegative. Finally, axiom (C) enables us to define Φ for coalitions S N .
Proof of Theorem 4.2
(Sufficiency) Trivial.
(Necessity) The proof is similar to that of Weber [18, Theorem 10] . We first observe that Theorem 4.1 applies. Hence, consider a finite set N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, and a subset S ⊆ N . Again, we can assume that S = ∅.
Consider T 1 , T 2 ⊆ N \ S and a permutation π on N such that π(T 1 ) = T 2 while leaving S fixed. Then, using axiom (S) and the gamesû T 1 ,û T 2 ∈ G N , we can write Next, consider nonempty sets S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N of the same cardinality, a set T ⊆ N \(S 1 ∪S 2 ), and a permutation π on N such that π(S 1 ) = S 2 while leaving T invariant. Then, using axiom (S) and the gameû T ∈ G N , we have πû T =û T and Finally, consider a nonempty finite set S ⊂ U , a finite set T ⊂ U \ S, two finite sets N 1 , N 2 ⊂ U such that n 1 = n 2 ≥ 1 and N 1 ∩ N 2 ⊇ S ∪ T , and a permutation π on U such that π(N 1 ) = N 2 leaving S and T invariant. Then, It follows that, for any finite N ⊂ U , n ≥ 1, and any S ⊆ N , the coefficients p 
